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A "Thrilling" Proposal: Federal Regulation of
America's Modem Day Scream Machines
INTRODUCTION
On August 28, 1999, Kim Bailey and her nine-year-old daughter
Jessica waited patiently for their turn to conquer the "Wild Won-
der," the dazzling new addition to Gillian's Wonderland Pier amuse-
ment park located on the tail end of the boardwalk in Ocean City,
New Jersey.' Filled with the excitement that many thrill-seekers
have come to thrive upon, Kim and Jessica boarded the "Wild Won-
der" train and began the slow chain-lifted ascent up the forty-one
degree lift hill, eagerly anticipating the first terrifying drop which
was surely moments away.2 Then, in an instant, their anticipation
turned to horror.3 Just as they approached the crest of the incline,
their train was released prematurely and instead of experiencing
the first drop, Kim, Jessica, and the rest of the riders of the "Wild
Wonder" train were rapidly and surprisingly propelled backwards
down the forty-one degree lift hill toward the station.4 As the run-
away train fiercely rounded the ninety-degree bend at the base of
the lift hill, Kim and her daughter were forcefully ejected from the
train and sent hurling through the air into the ride's steel support
beams.5 Both were killed instantly.
6
The above story is simply one of many that has become all too





6. See Jeff Pillets, Two Coaster Deaths Blamed on Bad Brake; State Cites Owner,
Equipment Manager, THE RECORD, Feb. 4, 2000, at Al. An investigation into the cause of the
accident revealed that the anti-rollback device on the roller coaster failed. As a result, Gil-
lian's Wonderland Pier was fined $25,000 and Zamnperla (the Italian company who manufac-
tured the ride) was fined $30,000. See id. Today, the "Wild Wonder" roller coaster is no
longer in operation at Gillain's Wonderland Pier. See Fatal Attraction, THE RECORD, Mar. 17,
2000, at A3. The tragedy which occurred on the "Wild Wonder" roller coaster received
national attention. See, e.g., Fred Anklam, Two Hurt, Two Killed in N.J. Roller Coaster Acci-
dent, USA TODAY, Aug. 30, 1999, at 2A, John Curran, Inspectors Eye Coaster.That Killed Two,
HOUSrON CHRONicLE, Aug. 30, 1999, at 3; John Curran, Two Killed on Roller Coaster: Mom,
Daughter Dead After New Ride's Car Rolls Backward at New Jersey Amusement Park,
DETRorr NEWS, Aug. 30, 1999, at A5; Robert D. McFadden, Roller Coaster Hurls Wrong Way,
Killing Two, NEW YORK TIMES LATE EDnMON, Aug. 30, 1999, at B1.
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familiar to the millions of fearless, thrill-seeking Americans who
flock to amusement parks from coast to coast each year in antici-
pation of the spinning, whirling, twisting, and stomach-dropping
sensations that modem rides have come to provide. 7 With names
like "Goliath," "Medusa," "Cobra," and "Mantis," America's modem
thrill-rides are taking consumers on incredible journeys of
record-breaking heights at mesmerizing speeds, and, in the process,
testing the limits of human endurance.8 Today's thrill-rides are huge,
complex machines capable of hurling riders through the sky at
unprecedented speed with remarkable force.9 Their design, mainte-
nance, and operation often "push the limits of physical tolerance
even for patrons in peak condition, let alone members of the broad
spectrum of the public who are invited to ride each day."10 How-
ever, despite record-breaking attendance at America's amusement
parks and increasing competition among amusement facility owners
to be the first to provide millions of willing riders with the tallest,
fastest, and steepest attraction, the federal government, as a result
of a 1981 amendment to the Consumer Product Safety Act, remains
powerless with respect to regulating a majority of these huge, com-
7. See, e.g., Jeff Gottlieb, Disneyland Closes Space Mountain After Accident Hurts
Nine, Los ANGELES TIMEs, Aug. 2, 2000, at B3 (addressing Disneyland's decision to temporarily
close the famed "Space Mountain" after a car derailment); David M. Herzenhorn, Five-Year
Old Critically Injured in Amusement Park Accident, NEW YORK TIMES LATE EDmON, July 4,
2000, at B5 (detailing the story of a five-year old who was submerged nearly twenty-five min-
utes after falling off a tube while riding a water ride at Lake Compounce Amusement Park in
Bristol, Connecticut); C. Bryson Hull, One Killed, Eleven Hurt After Six Flags Ride Cap-
sizes, HoUSrON CHRONICLE, Mar. 22, 1999, at A17 (providing the details of what happened
when a boat on an amusement ride overturned in waist-deep water at Six Flags Over Texas);
Brenden Sager, Thirty-Five Hurt on Kennywood Coaster, P1TrSBURGH POST GAZErrE, July 9,
1999, at Al (discussing the injuries sustained by riders after the collision of two trains on the
legendary Thunderbolt roller coaster at Kennywood Park just outside of Pittsburgh, Penn-
sylvania).
8. Approximately fifty-five new roller coasters opened in the United States between
January 1, 2000 and October 11, 2000. One of these roller coasters, "Millennium Force 2000"
at Cedar Point in Sandusky, Ohio, opened on May 13, 2000, as the tallest, steepest, and fast-
est steel roller coaster in the world with a height of 310 feet and an estimated speed of
ninety-two miles per hour. See Alice Lukens, A Roller-Coaster Ride on Safety, THE BALTimORE
SUN, May 22, 2000, at 2A (discussing the "Millennium Force 2000" as well as the National
Amusement Ride Safety Act which is currently pending in the United States House of Repre-
sentatives); The Roller Coaster Data Base (visited Mar. 11, 2001) <http://www.rcdb.com> (a
comprehensive searchable database with information and statistics on roller coasters in
North America).
9. See 145 CONG. REC. E2042 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1999) (statement made by Representa-




plex modern day scream machines."
This comment argues that the United States Congress should
grant the Consumer Product Safety Commission ("CPSC") the
power to regulate the construction and operation of rides perma-
nently fixed to amusement locations in the United States. 2 The fol-
lowing paragraphs will demonstrate that the granting of such power
by the United States Congress to the CPSC is not only permitted
under the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution, but
will also serve the important function of eliminating the current
inadequacies and gross disparities which have arisen between the
states with respect to the regulation of amusement rides perma-
nently fixed to a site.13 The plan of this comment is as follows: Sec-
tion I examines the current "crisis" in the amusement industry in
more detail (including some of the recent major accidents that are
summarized in Table A) and then discusses federal and state
approaches to regulating amusement rides permanently fixed to a
location. In this section, the current proposal before the United
States House of Representatives regarding regulation of permanent
amusement rides is discussed in detail, and then the approaches
taken by the fifty states with respect to regulation of amusement
rides permanently fixed to a site are examined briefly. The results
of this examination are presented in Table B. In section II, a discus-
sion of the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution is
presented as a basis for obtaining federal jurisdiction to regulate
rides permanently fixed to amusement sites. This section also sets
out additional reasons for federal intervention in the amusement
industry. Finally, section HI offers some concluding remarks.
11. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-81 (2000). After a dispute by the courts as to whether amuse-
ment rides were a "product" as defined under the Consumer Product Safety Act, Congress
amended the Act in 1981 to include within the definition of product only amusement rides
not permanently fixed to a site. See 15 U.S.C. § 2052(a)(1) (2000); infra notes 25-72.
12. The federal government currently has the power under the Consumer Product
Safety Act to regulate only amusement rides that are not permanently attached to a site (for
example, rides erected at traveling carnivals). Under the current version of the Consumer
Product Safety Act, a consumer product is defined to include, in relevant part:
[A]ny mechanical device which carries or conveys passengers along, around, or over a
fixed or restricted route or course or within a defined area for the purpose of giving
its passengers amusement, which is customarily controlled or directed by an individ-
"ual who is employed for that purpose and who is not a consumer with respect to such
device, and which is not permanently fixed to a site.
See 15 U.S.C. § 2052(a)(1) (2000).
13. Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution (the Commerce Clause) gives
Congress the power "to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several




A. The Current "Crisis" in the Amusement Industry
There is clearly a crisis in the amusement industry as evidenced
by the increased number of ride-related injuries and fatalities over
the past six years (see Table A describing selected accidents at
America's theme parks over the past three years). In 1998, there
were an estimated 9,200 ride-related injuries, representing a
twenty-four percent jump from 7,400 injuries in 1994 (even though
attendance during the period only rose twelve percent).14 The data
for 1999 indicates that this trend is continuing into the new millen-
nium. In the calendar year 1999, roughly 309 million individuals fre-
quented the roughly 405 amusement parks in the United States in
hopes of being safely entertained by the mammoth attractions that
many of these modem amusement parks have come to provide.
15
While many of these patrons likely assumed the entertainment
they were pursuing was safe, an alarming number of them went
home injured, and in a few rare instances some of them did not
return home at all. According to a report issued by the CPSC in
July of 2000, there were 10,400 hospital emergency room-treated
injuries stemming from amusement accidents in 1999, with about
7,000 of these injuries involving fixed rides and 3,000 involving
mobile rides.16 These numbers, which have alarmed the CPSC, illus-
trate "a marginally significant upward trend in fixed-site and total
amusement ride-related injuries and in the risk of fixed-site injury
defined as the estimated number of injuries per million attendance
at amusement parks."'7
While the numbers presented by the CPSC regarding ride-related
injuries in 1999 are certainly alarming, even more alarming is the
number of ride-related fatalities that occurred at America's amuse-
ment parks in 1999. In 1999 alone, six individuals lost their lives in
ride-related accidents at amusement parks.'8 Four of these deaths
occurred in the final week of August 1999, a week that U.S. News
14. See Marc Silver et al., Fatal Attractions: Are Amusement Park Rides Unsafe at
Any Speed?, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, Sept. 13, 1999, at 10 (reviewing the tragic acci-
dents at amusement parks in 1999 and the responses that these tragedies generated).
15. See Anthony DeBarros and Gene Sloan, Park Safety Rules Lax, USA TODAY, Apr. 7,
2000, at 1A (discussing the inadequacies and inconsistencies in current state laws regulating
the amusement industry).
16. See C. CRAIG MORRIS, U.S. CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY COMM'N, AMUSEMENT RIDE RELATED
INJURIES AND DEATHS IN THE U.S.: 1987-1999 (July 2000) at 2.
17. See id. at 8.
18. See Silver, supra note 14, at 10-11.
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and World Report deemed "one of the calamitous weeks in the his-
tory of America's amusement parks."19 In that week alone, a
twelve-year-old boy was killed after plummeting nearly 200 feet
from the "Drop Zone Stunt Tower" at Paramount's Great American
Park in Santa Clara, California, a mother and daughter were killed
when the "Wild Wonder" roller coaster at Gillian's Wonderland Pier
in Ocean City, New Jersey, unexpectedly malfunctioned, and a
twenty-year-old man was killed after wiggling loose from a harness
while riding the "Shockwave" roller coaster at Paramount's Kings
Dominion near Richmond, Virginia.
20
The alarming increases in ride-related injuries and fatalities have
led many to call for increased regulation. In terms of regulation,
"there is currently no federal oversight of amusement parks and
only limited regulation of smaller, traveling carnival shows."21 In
other words, current regulation of amusement parks is left to the
states, which are in many cases doing a poor job of ensuring that
modem thrill-rides adequately protect riders from the dangers asso-
ciated with the "thrills, chills, and spills" which amusement rides by
nature are designed to provide. Examples of lax regulation for both
mobile and fixed amusement rides are numerous. For example, a
patchwork of state laws enables ride owners to easily evade state
inspection and regulation of mobile rides by moving into a state
that currently has no inspection laws.22 In many states where
inspection and regulation laws are rigorous, the biggest entertainers
in the industry are still legally able to evade inspection and regula-
tion.23 Furthermore, because of wide variation in the language of
state laws regulating the amusement industry, no consistency exists
and thus it is difficult for safety officials to "pinpoint which parks
and which rides are problems."24 This evasion and inconsistency,
coupled with an increase in amusement accidents and evidence
that more rigid inspection and regulation requirements may lead to
a reduction in such accidents, has led many individuals to begin to
call for complete federal oversight of the amusement industry (spe-
cifically federal regulation of rides permanently fixed to an amuse-
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. See DeBarros and Sloan, supra note 15, at 2A.
22. See id.
23. See id. "Take for example Florida, which has one of the nation's most respected
programs. Although the state exempts big parks such as Disney World, it keeps a close eye





B. Federal Regulation of Amusement Rides Permanently Fixed to
a Site
The origins of federal government intervention with the construc-
tion and operation of amusement rides lies with the passage of the
Consumer Product Safety Act by the United States Congress in
October of 1972.25 In a response to a study undertaken by the
National Commission on Product Safety, Congress sought to pro-
tect the public against risks associated with consumer products, to
develop a uniform system for reporting injuries sustained by con-
sumers while using certain products, and to promote research
aimed at reducing product-related injuries.26 In order to achieve
these goals, Congress (through the passage of the Consumer Prod-
uct Safety Act) authorized the creation of the CPSC and gave this
agency the power to investigate consumer products that appeared
to pose an unreasonable risk of injury to the public. 7 While the
Consumer Product Safety Act as passed in 1972 defined the term
"product" in a very broad manner, no specific mention was made
with respect to amusement rides.2 8 After several accidents involving
amusement rides prompted investigation by the CPSC, the courts
were faced with the issue as to whether or not Congress, through
the Consumer Product Safety Act, had in fact granted the CPSC the
25. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-81 (1972) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-81 (2000)).
26. See 15 U.S.C. § 2051(b) (2000). The purpose of this Act was and still is:
(1) to protect the public against unreasonable risk of injuries associated with prod-
ucts; (2) to assist consumers in evaluating the comparative safety of consumer prod-
ucts; (3) to develop uniform safety standards for consumer products and to minimize
conflicting state and local regulations; and (4) to promote research and investigation
into the causes and prevention of product related deaths, illnesses, and injuries.
See id.
27. See Susan J. Reiss, Amusement Park Safety: Who Should Regulate?, 5 CARDOZO
ARTS AND ENIERTAiNMENT LAW JOURNAL 195, 197 (1985) (providing a detailed history of the
Consumer Product Safety Act as the Act relates to the ability of the federal government to
regulate amusement rides).
28. See 15 U.S.C. § 2052(a)(1) (1972) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 2052(a)(1) (2000)).
Under the 1972 version of the Consumer Product Safety Act, the term "consumer product"
referred to:
[A]ny article, or component thereof, produced or distributed (i) for sale to a consumer
for use in or around a permanent or temporary household or residence, a school, in
recreation, or otherwise, or (ii) for the personal use, consumption, enjoyment of a
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power to investigate amusement related accidents.29 Park owners
and manufacturers, resisting federal interference in their industry,
challenged the jurisdiction of the CPSC to investigate such acci-
dents. The CPSC responded by arguing that it had power to investi-
gate because of the broad definition of the term "product" under
the Consumer Product Safety Act.30 The courts would ultimately be
split as to whether an amusement ride fit the definition of product
under the Consumer Product Safety Act.
31
In November of 1977, the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia became one of the first courts to address this
issue in Consumer Product Safety Commission v. Chance Manu-
facturing Co.32 In Chance, the CPSC filed an action against Chance
Manufacturing Co. alleging that the "Zipper" ride that the company
produced and distributed to amusement facilities across the coun-
try was "imminently hazardous" as defined under the Consumer
Product Safety Act.3 The CPSC requested that the court, in accor-
dance with the Consumer Product Safety Act, enjoin operation of
any "Zipper" ride until Chance Manufacturing Co. took corrective
measures, satisfactory to the CPSC, to ensure that the "Zipper" ride
29. See Reiss, supra note 27, at 199.
30. See id. at 198-99. Apparently, the CPSC felt that the Consumer Product Safety Act
gave it jurisdiction to investigate any accidents involving amusement rides. See CPSC Advi-
sory Opinion No. 225 (October 21, 1975) (holding that paddle boats used as amusement rides
constituted a product within the meaning of the Consumer Product Safety Act so long as-
such usage did not fall within the confines of the Federal Boat Safety Act); CPSC Advisory
Opinion No. 153 (November 13, 1974) (stating that amusement rides are "recreation" and
therefore fall within the definition of product under the Consumer Product Safety Act
regardless of whether the consumer pays to ride).
31. Compare Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. Chance Mfg. Co., 441 F Supp. 228
(D.D.C. 1977) (holding that the CPSC had the power under the Consumer Product Safety Act
to enjoin operation of the "Zipper" ride), and State Fair of Texas v. Consumer Prod. Safety
Comm'n, 650 F2d 1324 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that the "Swiss Skyride" was a product which
fell within the definition of the Consumer Product Safety Act), with Robert K. Bell Enter. v.
Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 645 E2d 26 (10th Cir. 1981) (where the appellate court
found that the "Skyride" amusement ride that took visitors between points within an amuse-
ment park was not a consumer product for the purposes of the Consumer Product Safety
Act), and Walt Disney Prod. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, No. 79-0170-LEW-(Px), 1979
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12996 (C.D. Ca. Apr. 17, 1979) (also holding that the "Skyride" amusement
ride was not a consumer product which could be regulated by the CPSC under the Con-
sumer Product Safety Act).
32. 441 E Supp. 228 (D.D.C. 1977).
33. See id. at 229. The "Zipper" ride consisted primarily of a base with attached cars
rotating in a 360-degree arc. The CPSC alleged that because of some faulty door latching sys-
tems on the attached cars, four individuals were killed and two others seriously injured. See
id. at 230-31. The "term 'imminently hazardous product' means a consumer product which
presents imminent and unreasonable risk of death, serious illness or severe personal injury."
See 15 U.S.C. § 2061(a) (2000).
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no longer posed a hazard to riders.3" Chance Manufacturing Co.
responded by questioning the jurisdiction of the CPSC to recom-
mend any such corrective measures, arguing that the "Zipper" ride
was not a consumer product within the meaning of the Consumer
Product Safety Act.
35
In holding that the "Zipper" ride was subject to regulation by the
CPSC, the court first noted that the ride had "never been sold to
individual consumers nor used except in recreation."36 Therefore,
according to the court, the only way the CPSC could have authority
to regulate the "Zipper" ride under the Consumer Product Safety
Act would be if the ride was distributed "for the personal use, con-
sumption or enjoyment of a consumer .. in recreation or other-
wise."37 Because both parties agreed that the "Zipper" ride was
used in recreation and because the court found that the riders of
the "Zipper" were exposed to the potential dangers outlined by the
CPSC (thereby satisfying the personal use element), the court con-
cluded that the CPSC could regulate the "Zipper" ride.38 For further
support, the court scrutinized the legislative history of the Con-
sumer Product Safety Act, attempting to determine the intent of
Congress in passing the Act.39 The revelation that both Houses of
Congress intended that the definition of consumer product "be con-
strued broadly to advance the Act's articulated purpose of protect-
ing consumers from hazardous products," was further evidence
used by the court to solidify the decision that the CPSC could regu-
late the "Zipper" ride if, in fact, the ride was determined to be
"imminently dangerous."
40
Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
found that amusement rides fall within the definition of "product"
34. See Chance Mfg. Co., 441 F Supp. at 229. Under the Consumer Product Safety Act
where the CPSC brings an action alleging that a product is "imminently hazardous" as
defined under the Consumer Product Safety Act:
The district court in which such action is filed shall have jurisdiction to declare such
product an imminently hazardous consumer product... and to grant such temporary
or permanent relief as may be necessary to protect the public from such risk. Such
relief may include a mandatory order requiring the notification of the risk to purchas-
ers of such product known to the defendant, public notice, the recall, the repair or
replacement of, or refund for, such product.
See 15 U.S.C. § 2061(b)(1) (2000).
35. See Chance Mfg. Co., 441 F. Supp. at 229.
36. Id. at 231.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 232-33.
39. Id. at 231-32.
40. See Chance Mfg. Co., 441 F. Supp. at 231.
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as defined under the Consumer Product Safety Act in State Fair of
Texas v. Consumer Product Safety Commission.41 In this case, the
court offered several reasons as to why the CPSC had the authority:
to investigate and obtain documents relating to an amusement acci-
dent which occurred on an aerial tramway ride (the "Swiss Sky-
ride") located at the State Fair in Texas.42 First, the court reasoned
that the "Swiss Skyride" was indeed an article, rejecting the argu-
ment presented by Steck and Staph Attractions (the operators of
the ride) that amusement rides could not be articles under the Con-
sumer Product Safety Act because of their sheer size." Second, the
court noted that the "Swiss Skyride" was distributed and used by
consumers. 44 With respect to distribution, the court reasoned that
the ride was in fact customarily produced for use in amusement
parks and was therefore not, as Steck and Staph Attractions sug-
gested, exempt from regulation by the CPSC under any of the
exemptions provided for in the Consumer Product Safety Act.45
Furthermore, the court noted that since riders enjoyed the benefit
of being transported from one end of the park to another (and the
view during the transportation), the riders received enjoyment from
the ride.
46
The court then proceeded to reject an argument by the ride oper-
ators that the ride was not within the definition of "product" as
defined by the Consumer Product Safety Act because it was not
used for recreation but instead only for transportation. 47 Addition-
ally, the court denied a request by Steck and Staph Attractions to
interpret and apply other sections of the Consumer Product Safety
Act (those dealing with the requirement that the CPSC be able to
obtain a free sample of a product or obtain a product at cost) to
the case at hand, stating that these sections were wholly irrelevant
41. See 650 F2d 1324 (5th Cir. 1981).
42. Id. at 1325-26.
43. Id. at 1329. The court reasoned that because Congress found it necessary to specifi-
cally exempt aircraft and boats from the definition of consumer product, size is not a defin-
ing limitation to the term "article." Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1330. Specifically, the operators argued that the "Skyride" was not a "prod-
uct" as the term is defined under the Consumer Product Safety Act because a specific excep-
tion in the Act excludes from the authority of the CPSC "any article which is not customarily
produced or distributed for sale to, or use or consumption by, or enjoyment of a consumer."
See 15 U.S.C. § 2052(a)(1)(A) (2000).
46. State Fair of Texas, 650 F2d at 1331. The court noted that "not only do passengers
use the 'Skyride' but they also enjoy it for sight-seeing and benefit of being transported." Id.
47. Id. at 1331.
2001
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and would only produce puzzling results in the instant case.48 After
summarizing these reasons and briefly referencing the legislative
history of the Consumer Product Safety Act, the court concluded
that the "Swiss Skyride" could be regulated by the CPSC in accor-
dance with the Consumer Product Safety Act.49
Despite the consistency in the holdings of the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Columbia and the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit, federal regulation of amusement rides by the
CPSC was still in question, as other federal courts reached results
contrary to those of the Chance and State Fair of Texas courts.
For example, in Walt Disney Productions v. Consumer Product
Safety Commission,50 a federal district court in California found
the "Skyride," a common device at many amusement parks used to
transfer patrons from one end of the park to another, was not, as
the Fifth Circuit held, a "product" as defined under the Consumer
Product Safety Act.51 The trial court relied on sections of the Con-
sumer Product Safety Act which allow the CPSC to obtain free
samples of consumer products and purchase consumer products at
cost. Recognizing that the CPSC could obviously not obtain a free
sample of the "Skyride" (nor obtain the "Skyride" at cost), the court
reasoned that such a ride could not possibly be included within the
definition of product under the Consumer Product Safety Act.
52
In Robert K Bell v. Consumer Product Safety Commission,5 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reached the
same conclusion as the Walt Disney court regarding CPSC regula-
tion of amusement rides under the Consumer Product Safety Act
but rationalized the result differently. In Bell, the CPSC sent a
request for information to Bell Enterprises regarding an accident
involving an amusement park tramway in Texas (another "Sky-
ride").M In response to this request, Bell Enterprises sought a
declaratory judgment by contending that the Consumer Product
Safety Act did not apply to amusement parks or amusement park
rides and that, consequently, the CPSC lacked jurisdiction to inves-
48. Id. at 1332. Under the Consumer Product Safety Act, the CPSC is authorized to
obtain free samples of imported consumer products and purchase domestic consumer prod-
ucts at cost. See 15 U.S.C. § 2066(b) (2000); 15 U.S.C. § 2067(0 (2000).
49. State Fair of Texas, 650 F2d at 1333-34.
50. No. 79-0170-LEW-(Px), 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12996 (C.D. Ca. Apr. 17, 1979).
51. Id. at 7-8.
52. Id. at 5-6. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 2066(b) (2000); 15 U.S.C. § 2067(0 (2000).
53. 645 F2d 26 (10th Cir. 1981).
54. See id. at 27.
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tigate the accident on the "Skyride."55 The appellate court (in over-
ruling the trial court) agreed with Bell Enterprises by finding that
amusement rides were not encompassed within the term product as
defined under the Consumer Product Safety Act.5
Implicitly recognizing (as the court in Chance did) that the "Sky-
ride" was not sold to individual consumers and was only used in
recreation, the appellate court in Bell noted that the decision as to
whether the ride was a product within the definition of the Con-
sumer Product Safety Act would ultimately hinge on the "personal
use, consumption, or enjoyment" clause of the definitional section
of the Act.57 After examining the legislative history of this defini-
tional section, the court concluded this section was added "not for
the purpose of enlarging the scope of the articles, but to cover all
manners of distribution."5 That is, according to the court, the "per-
sonal use, consumption, or enjoyment" clause was intended to
encompass the same articles that were covered under the "sale"
clause but which reached consumers through means other than
sales (such as promotional samples or gifts). 5 9 Using this rationale,
the court concluded that the CPSC could not use the "personal use,
consumption, or enjoyment" clause to obtain jurisdiction over
amusement rides because such rides were not in any manner "dis-
tributed" to consumers. 60 In addition, the Bell court elected to give
special consideration to the fact that riders are generally not in
control and possession of amusement rides at any given time.61
Because the court determined that control and possession were
important factors to consider in analyzing whether an object can be
deemed a product within the definition of the Consumer Product
Safety Act, the CPSC could not obtain jurisdiction to investigate
amusement rides without a showing that the rider was in control of
the ride.62 A final reason provided by the court for rejecting the
ability of the CPSC to investigate the "Skyride" accident centered
on the court's interpretation that the Consumer Product Safety Act
was intended to cover only articles used "in or around... a house-
55. See id.
56. See id. at 29. See generally Robert K Bell Enter. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n,
484 F Supp. 1221 (N.D. Okla. 1980).
57. Id. at 28.
58. See Reiss, supra note 27, at 200.
59. Robert K Bell Enter., 645 E2d at 28-29.
60. Id.





With federal courts across the nation split regarding the ability of
the CPSC to regulate amusement rides under the Consumer Prod-
uct Safety Act, the United States Supreme Court was set to defmi-
tively decide the issue in 1981. 64 However, just prior to oral argu-
ments before the Court, the United States Congress amended the
Consumer Product Safety Act.65 The 1981 amendments to the Con-
sumer Product Safety Act, an apparent attempt to clarify the incon-
sistent federal court decisions from across the nation, added a sec-
tion that made clear that the CPSC only had jurisdiction to regulate
amusement rides not permanently fixed to a site.6 Because the
1981 amendments to the Consumer Product Safety Act were passed
as part of the Omnibus Legislation Act of 1981, the rationale behind
the decision of the United States Congress to limit the power of the
CPSC to regulate only rides not permanently fixed to a site is
unclear.6 7 However, at least one scholar has suggested that this
decision was the product of legislative compromise, premised upon
the belief that because mobile amusement rides move frequently
across state lines, the need for federal regulation of such rides was
stronger than the need to regulate rides permanently fixed to a site,
which the states could do with ease.68
While there was some indication in the mid-1980's that the
United States Congress might restore jurisdiction to the CPSC to
regulate amusement rides at fixed sites, bills introduced in the
United States House of Representatives and United States Senate
were ultimately rejected for various reasons.69 From the mid-1980's
through the late 1990's, the United States Congress gave little atten-
tion to the issue of amusement ride safety; that is until October of
1999 when Representative Edward Markey from Massachusetts
introduced "The National Amusement Park Ride Safety Act."70 Mar-
63. See id.
64. See Reiss, supra note 27, at 202. The United States Supreme Court was set to hear
State Fair of Texas v. Consumer Product Safety Commission, 650 F2d 1330 (5th Cir. 1981),
on appeal but the 1981 amendments were passed just prior to oral argument. Consequently,
the "judgment was vacated and the case was remanded to the trial court with direction to
dismiss it as moot." See id. at n.67.
65. See 15 U.S.C. § 2052(a)(1) (2000).
66. See Reiss, supra note 27, at 202.
67. See id. at 203.
68. See. id. at n.70 (discussing information obtained from interviews that the author
conducted with those close to the amendment process in 1981).
69. See id. at 212-19 (summarizing the various proposals before the United States Con-
gress in the mid-1980's with respect to federal regulation of permanent amusement rides).
70. H.R. 3032, 106th Cong. (1999).
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key's bill is aimed at "closing the loophole" created by the 1981
amendments to the Consumer Product Safety Act by restoring juris-
diction to the CPSC to regulate the operation and construction of
permanent amusement rides.7" Currently the bill is being debated in
House Committee hearings and, thus, at the present time the power
to regulate permanent amusement rides still remains, as a result of
the 1981 amendments to the Consumer Product Safety Act, within
the sole discretionary power of each individual state.
72
C. State Approaches to Regulating Permanent Amusement Rides
Table B summarizes the current status of state laws regulating
mobile rides and rides permanently fixed to a site in the United
States. Currently, eleven states have no laws requiring inspection of
rides permanently fixed to an amusement site.73 In addition, eight
states have no specific requirements (such as insurance minimums
or permit requirements) that must be met before a ride is placed
into operation.74 In the remaining states that do require inspection
and/or impose pre-ride operation requirements, there is no general
consensus as to how much insurance should be required and what
requirements should be imposed before a ride can be operated. A
random sampling of state laws, with a bit of background on amuse-
ment parks in the state, illustrates this inconsistency.
The State of California is home to a multitude of amusement
parks, including some of the most well known in the nation such
as Disneyland, Paramount's Great America, and Six Flags Magic
Mountain. 75 California "provides a comprehensive approach subject-
ing amusement parks with permanent amusement rides to the
authority of Cal-OSHA."76 Under the California program, annual
71. Id. Specifically, the bill amends the Consumer Product Safety Act to include amuse-
ment rides that are permanently fixed to a site within the definition of "consumer product,"
thereby giving the CPSC jurisdiction over such rides. Additionally, the bill authorizes the
appropriations necessary ($500,000) to fund CPSC regulation of permanent amusement rides.
Id.
72. The most recent activity with respect to the bill occurred on May 16, 2000, when a
hearing was held in front of the House Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade, and
Consumer Protection. See 146 CONG. REc. D474 (daily ed. May 16, 2000).
73. See Consumer Product Safety Commission, Directory of State Amusement Ride
Safety Officials (visited Mar. 11, 2001) <http://www.cpsc.gov/cpscpub/pubs/amuse.html>.
74. See id.
75. See THE AMERICAN COASTER ENTHUSIASTS, GUIDE TO RIDE 2000 34-42 (Digital Prepress,
2000).
76. See David Kremenetsky, Regulation of Permanent Amusement Park Rides, 31
McGEORGE LAw REVIEW 633, 635 (discussing California's approach to regulating amusement
rides permanently fixed to a site).
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inspections of rides permanently fixed to a site by a qualified safety
inspector are required. 77 Additionally, a ride owner must show
proof of insurance before the ride can be operated and must main-
tain accurate records of any accidents that occur on the ride (in
addition to establishing programs that will adequately train park
employees to run the ride).7"
North Dakota lacks an established amusement park and, conse-
quently, imposes little requirements on the operation of amusement
rides in the state. Under the North Dakota statute, "no person may
operate an amusement ride unless that person has filed with the
governing body of the city or county where that person is intending
to operate the amusement ride an affidavit that the ride has been
inspected by a qualified inspector" and that a current insurance
policy exists insuring the owner against liability for an accident
occurring on the ride.79 The statute also requires owners of rides to
keep records on maintenance operations, inspections, and serious
accidents.
8 0
Ten amusement parks are located in the State of Ohio, including
Cedar Point in Sandusky, Ohio - the home of fourteen roller
coasters including the "Millennium Force 2000," which at the time
of its opening in May of 2000 was the tallest, steepest, and fastest
roller coaster in the world.8' Perhaps as a result of the numerous
parks in Ohio and the record-breaking nature of many rides at Ohio
parks (such as the "Millennium Force 2000"), the Ohio statute regu-
lating rides at amusement parks is fairly stringent.8 2 Under the Ohio
statute, an advisory council on amusement ride safety is mandated
and its purpose is to investigate subjects "pertaining to amusement
ride safety, including administrative, engineering, and technical sub-
jects, and make findings and recommendations to the director of
agriculture."s3 Furthermore, the statute requires the owner of an
amusement ride to apply for an annual permit and submit to an
inspection by a state official prior to the opening of a ride each
season8" In addition, before the permit will be issued, the ride
77. CAu LAB. CODE § 7924 (West Supp. 2000).
78. CAL LAB. CODE §§ 7926-27 (West Supp. 2000).
79. N.D. CENT. CODE § 53-05.1-02 (2000).
80. N.D. CENT. CODE § 53-05.1-03 (2000).
81. See Alice Lukens, A RoUer-Coaster Ride on Safety, THE BALTIMORE SUN, May 22,
2000, at 2A (discussing the "Millennium Force 2000" roller coaster); THE AMERICAN COASTER
ENTHusIASTS, supra note 75, at 79-82.
82. Omo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1711.50-1711.99 (West 1997).
83. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1711.52 (West 1997).
84. OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 1711.53 (West 1997).
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owner must provide an insurance certificate indicating that an ade-
quate amount of insurance has been purchased to cover any acci-
dents that may occur on the ride.8 Finally, the statute imposes a
requirement on owners of rides to maintain up-to-date copies of
accident reports, inspections, and temporary cessation orders.86
In 1985, the Pennsylvania legislature passed the "Amusement
Ride Inspection Act" which is similar to the Ohio statute.8 7 Under
the Pennsylvania statute, an amusement ride safety board exists to
carry out the provisions of the Act.88 Under the Act, the Depart-
ment of Agriculture is to oversee the operation of amusement rides
and ensure that the owner of each ride has applied for a permit,
has the ride inspected on a monthly basis, and carries a minimum
insurance amount to insure the ride owner against any liability
stemming from accidents that occur on the ride.89 Furthermore, the
Act requires the ride owner to shut down a ride when a serious
injury or death occurs and authorizes the Department of Agricul-
ture to issue a stop-use order when a ride owner is found to be in
violation of the Act.90
In South Dakota, where amusement parks are few and far
between, a liability insurance requirement exists whereby no indi-
vidual may in any case own, operate or lease an amusement ride
unless the person purchases insurance in an amount not less than
one million dollars against liability for injury or death to persons
arising out of the use of the amusement ride.91 While the South
Dakota statute requires a minimum insurance amount, it leaves the
right to inspect amusement rides to the discretion of local munici-
palities or counties.
92
II. FEDERAL REGULATION OF PERMANENT AMUSEMENT RIDES
A. The Power of the Federal Government to Regulate Under the
Commerce Clause
In order to survive constitutional challenge by the amusement
industry or any other interested party with standing to challenge
85. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1711.54 (West 1997).
86. Oino REV. CODE ANN. § 1711.55 (West 1997).
87. 4 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 401419 (West 1995).
88. 4 PA. STAT. ANN. § 405 (West 1995).
89. 4 PA. STAT. ANN. § 407 (West 1995); 4 PA. STAT. ANN. § 414 (West 1995).
90. 4 PA STAT. ANN. § 407 (West 1995).
91. S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 42-10-2 (Michie 1991).
92. S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 42-10-3 (Michie 1991).
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federal interference, any regulation by the federal government
regarding fixed amusement rides must be firmly grounded in the
United States Constitution.93 A brief analysis of the United States
Constitution suggests that such regulation would be constitutionally
permissible given the language of Article I, Section 8 of the United
States Constitution (the Commerce Clause).94 Article I, Section 8 of
the United States Constitution definitively gives Congress the dis-
tinct power "to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes."95 Because
the federal government already has the power, pursuant to the Con-
sumer Product Safety Act and the Commerce Clause, to regulate
the construction and operation of mobile amusement rides, logic
suggests that the same sources of authority should be available to
Congress as a basis for justifying federal regulation of permanent
amusement rides.96 However, because there is an obvious distinc-
tion between mobile amusement rides and permanent amusement
rides, an analysis of judicial interpretation of the Commerce Clause
is necessary in order to ensure that the federal government can, in
fact, constitutionally regulate permanent amusement rides.
97
93. Standing is "a concept utilized to determine if a party is sufficiently affected so as
to insure that a justiciable controversy is presented to the court; it is the right to take the
initial step that frames the legal issues for ultimate adjudication by court or jury." See
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1405 (6th ed. 1990).
94. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3.
95. Id.
96. The ability of the federal government to regulate under the Consumer Product
Safety Act is clearly grounded in the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.
The Consumer Product Safety Act states in relevant part:
The Congress finds that: (1) an unacceptable number of consumer products which
present unreasonable risks of injury are distributed in commerce; (2) complexities of
consumer products and the diverse nature and abilities of consumers using them fre-
quently result in an inability of users to anticipate risks and to safeguard themselves
adequately; (3) the public should be protected against unreasonable risks of injury
associated with consumer products; (4) control by state and local governments of
unreasonable risks of injury associated with consumer products is inadequate and
may be burdensome to manufacturers; (5) existing Federal authority to protect con-
sumers from exposure to consumer products presenting unreasonable risks of injuries
is inadequate; and (6) regulation of consumer products the distribution of which
affects interstate or foreign commerce is necessary to carry out this chapter.
15 U.S.C. § 2051(a) (2000).
97. Rides located at carnivals, fairs, or festivals are referred to in the amusement
industry as mobile amusement rides because they are frequently moved from one site to
another, often crossing state borders in the process. Rides located at amusement parks are
referred to in the amusement industry as permanent amusement rides since they remain at
the same location for extended periods of time. Note that it is possible for the same type of
ride to be a mobile amusement ride in one situation and a permanent amusement ride in
another (consider the ever popular "Ferris Wheel"). See C. CRAmG MORRIS, U.S. CONSUMER
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While only current judicial interpretation of the Commerce
Clause is relevant to the ability of the federal government to regu-
late permanent amusement rides, a brief historical analysis is none-
theless required in order to understand the full scope of the Com-
merce Clause. The first major case construing the Commerce
Clause came in 1824 when the United States Supreme Court
decided Gibbons v. Ogden.18 The Gibbons case involved a conflict
between Ogden, who had been granted a monopoly right by the
State of New York to operate steamboats between New York and
New Jersey, and Gibbons, who began operating steamboats (which
were licensed under a federal statute) between New York and New
Jersey.9 After the state court granted an injunction ordering Gib-
bons to stop operating his boats in New York waters, Gibbons
appealed to the United States Supreme Court. 1°° In a landmark deci-
sion, Justice Marshall upheld the right of Gibbons to operate his
steamboats in New York waters, holding that the Commerce Clause
was to be construed broadly (and thus the federal license granted
to Gibbons superceded the state monopoly rights granted to
Ogden). 10 1 According to Justice Marshall, Congress could constitu-
tionally regulate any interstate commerce (even if the regulation
were to affect matters occurring within a state) as long as the
activity had some commercial connection with another state.
10 2
From Gibbons until the late 1800's, the broad interpretation of
the Commerce Clause implemented by Justice Marshall continued,
as the United States Supreme Court had little opportunity to con-
sider the power of the federal government to regulate under the
Commerce Clause. However, in the early part of the twentieth cen-
tury, the United States Supreme Court handed down a multitude of
decisions closely scrutinizing the ability of the federal government
to regulate under the Commerce Clause. In Houston East and West
Railway Co. v. United States'0 3 (the "Shreveport Rate Case"), the
United States Supreme Court upheld the right of the Interstate
Commerce Commission to prevent railroad companies from setting
rates for hauls totally within Texas.1 4 The United States Supreme
PROD. SAFETY COMM'N, AMUSEMENT RIDE RELATED INJURIES AND DEATHS IN THE U.S.: 1987-1999
(July 2000) at 4.
98. 22 U.S. 1 (1824).
99. Id. at 2-3.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 239-40.
102. Id. at 237-40.
103. 234 U.S. 342 (1914).
104. Id. at 359-60.
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Court recognized that the rate-setting by the railroad companies for
intrastate routes in Texas was discriminating against interstate traf-
fic and held that the commerce power gives the federal government
the right to "regulate all matters having a close and substantial rela-
tion to interstate traffic [such] that control is essential or appropri-
ate to the security of that traffic."105
In addition to the regulation of intrastate commerce, the federal
governnment also frequently attempted to use the Commerce Clause
to prohibit the interstate shipment of certain goods in the early
part of the twentieth century. Given this frequent regulation, the
United States Supreme Court was presented with a multitude of
opportunities to scrutinize the powers of the federal government
under the Commerce Clause. However, the United States Supreme
Court did not seem to stray from the view presented in the
"Shreveport Rate Case," and, consequently, the federal government
was granted wide power to prohibit the interstate shipment of cer-
tain goods. In Champion v. Ames 10 6 (the "Lottery Case"), the United
States Supreme Court upheld the Federal Lottery Act which, using
the Commerce Clause as a "jurisdictional hook," prohibited the
interstate shipment of lottery tickets on the theory that such pre-
vention was justified in order to regulate the moral character of the
nation. 107 Extending this view, the United States Supreme Court
105. Id. at 351. Apparently the fact that the Interstate Commerce Commission sought
to regulate solely intrastate activity did not place such regulation beyond congressional con-
trol. According to the United States Supreme Court:
The fact that carriers are instruments of intrastate commerce, as well as of interstate
commerce, does not derogate from the complete and paramount authority of Congress
over the latter or preclude the Federal power from being exerted to prevent the intra-
state operations of such carriers from being made a means of injury to that which has
been confided to Federal care. Wherever the interstate and intrastate transactions of
carriers are so related that the government of the one involves the control of the
other, it is Congress, and not the State, that is entitled to prescribe the final and domi-
nant rule, for otherwise Congress would be denied the exercise of its constitutional
authority and the State, and not the Nation, would be supreme within the national
field.
Id. at 351-52.
106. 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
107. Id. at 357. Specifically, the majority reasoned:
*As a State may, for the purpose of guarding the morals of its own people, forbid all
sales of lottery tickets within its limits, so Congress, for the purpose of guarding the
people of the United States against the "widespread pestilence of lotteries" and to pro-
tect the commerce which concerns all the States, may prohibit the carrying of lottery
tickets from one state to another. In legislating upon the subject of the traffic in lot-
tery tickets, as carried on through interstate commerce, Congress only supplemented
the action of those states - perhaps all of them - which, for the protection of the
public morals, prohibit the drawing of lotteries, as well as the sale or circulation of
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upheld the right of the federal government, pursuant to the Pure
Food and Drug Act of 1906 (which also used the Commerce Clause
as a "jurisdictional hook"), to seize adulterated eggs once they had
arrived at their point of destination in Hipolite Egg Co. v. United
States.1
os
Eventually, however, the United States Supreme Court began cur-
tailing the broad power of the federal government to regulate under
the Commerce Clause, as indicated by a series of decisions handed
down between 1918 and 1937. For example, in Hammer v.
Dagenhart1 9 (the "Child Labor Law Case"), the United States
Supreme Court struck down a federal statute which essentially pro-
hibited the interstate transportation of articles made by companies
who employed child labor.110 In Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States"' (the "Sick Chicken Case"), the United States Supreme
Court invalidated the conviction of Schechter under the National
Industrial Recovery Act on the grounds that the federal government
could not constitutionally regulate Schechter's activities because his
activities were not within the current stream of commerce and did
not directly affect interstate commerce.112 In another defeat for the
lottery tickets, within their respective limits. It said, in effect, that it would not permit
the declared policy of the states, which sought to protect their people against the mis-
chiefs of the lottery business, to be overthrown or disregarded by the agency of inter-
state commerce.
Id.
The authority of the federal government to use the Commerce Clause of the United States
Constitution to regulate the moral character of the nation was not limited to the regulation
of lottery tickets. For example, the United States Supreme Court held that the federal gov-
ernment could constitutionally prohibit the transportation of women in interstate commerce
for immoral purposes. See Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917). Similarly, the
United States Supreme Court upheld the power of the federal government under the Com-
merce Clause to regulate the transportation of intoxicating liquors. See Clark Distilling Co. v.
Western Maryland Railway Co., 242 U.S. 311 (1917).
108. 220 U.S. 45 (1911).
109. 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
110. Id. The United States Supreme Court distinguished this case from the "Lottery
Case," stating that in the "Lottery Case" the federal government was prohibiting the inter-
state transportation of the evil itself (the lottery tickets) but that in the instant case the fed-
eral government was prohibiting the interstate transportation of a by-product of the evil itself
(the companies utilizing child labor). See id. at 272-73.
111. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
112. Id. at 550. The National Industrial Recovery Act essentially gave the President the
power to adopt codes of fair competition for various trades or industries. See GERALD GuN-
THER AND KATHLEEN SULLVAN, CONSTrUTmONAL LAW 116-17 (13th ed. 1997). Specifically:
The National Industrial Recovery Act provides that "codes of fair competition," which
shall be the "standards of fair competition" for the trades and industries to which they
relate, may be approved by the President upon application of representative associa-
tions of the trades or industries to be affected, or may be prescribed by him on his
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federal government, a majority of the United States Supreme Court
in Carter v. Carter Coal Co.113 (the "Carter Coal Case") struck
down the ability of the federal government to use the Commerce
Clause as a means to set maximum hours and minimum wages for
workers in coal mines.
114
Decisions by the United States Supreme Court, like those in the
Child Labor Case, the Sick Chicken Case, and the Carter Coal Case,
represent the beginnings of the modem trend in Commerce Clause
analysis by the Court.15 Under this modem analysis, the United
States Supreme Court analyzes Commerce Clause cases by looking
at the effect the regulated activity has on interstate commerce."
6
Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court now requires that
the federal government, when regulating under the Commerce
Clause, use a reasonable means to achieve a stated goal."7 The
case best illustrating how the Court will employ this modem analy-
sis is United States v. Lopez."8
In Lopez, the defendant was charged with the knowing posses-
sion of a firearm in a school zone, in violation of the Gun-Free
own motion. Their provisions are to be enforced by injunctions from the federal
courts, and "any violation of any of their provisions in any transaction in or affecting
interstate commerce" is to be deemed an unfair method of competition within the
meaning of the Federal Trade Commission Act and is to be punished as a crime
against the United States. Before approving, the President is to make certain findings
as to the character of the association presenting the code and absence of design to
promote monopoly or oppress small enterprises, and must find that it will "tend to
effectuate the policy of this title." Codes permitting monopolies or monopolistic prac-
tices are forbidden. The President may "impose such conditions (including require-
ments for the making of reports and the keeping of accounts) for the protection of
consumers, competitors, employees and others, and in the furtherance of the public
interest, and may provide such exceptions and exemptions from the provisions of
such code," as he, in his discretion, deems necessary "to effectuate the policy herein
declared." A code prescribed by him is to have the same effect as one approved on
application.
Schechter Poultry Corp., 295 U.S. at 296.
113. 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
114. Id. at 316-17.
115. See U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 556-57 (1995).
116. For example, in 1937, the United States Supreme Court upheld the right of the
National Labor Relations Board to prevent unfair labor practices by Jones and Laughlin (a
large integrated steel producer) on the grounds that such unfair labor practices, although
done locally, would have a substantial effect on interstate commerce given the complexity of
operations by Jones and Laughlin. NLRB v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
117. For example, in 1941 the United States Supreme Court upheld a portion of the
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 which made it a crime to employ workers to make goods
shipped interstate at other than prescribed rates and hours on the grounds that such a provi-
sion was a reasonable means of preventing goods made by "cheap" labor from being shipped
in interstate commerce. U.S. v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
118. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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School Zones Act of 1990, which "prohibit[ed] any individual know-
ingly to possess a firearm at a place that the individual knows, or
has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone."" 9 The issue
before the United States Supreme Court was whether the Gun-Free
School Zones Act was a valid exercise of the federal government's
power to regulate commerce under the Commerce Clause.120 A
majority of the United States Supreme Court struck down the stat-
ute, by a five to four vote, on the ground that the statute was
unconstitutional. 12' The majority (after first reviewing the activity
that the federal government can permissibly regulate under the
Commerce Clause) reasoned that in order for the Gun-Free School
Zones Act to be within the confines of the Commerce Clause, the
Act must be directed at an activity which substantially affects inter-
state commerce (as opposed to activity that simply affects inter-
state commerce). 122 The majority then noted that the activity being
regulated by the Gun-Free School Zones Act was not commercial
and, as a result, for the statute to be constitutional there must be
an obvious connection between the activity being regulated by the
statute and interstate commerce.123 After finding no obvious con-
nection between the regulation of guns in school zones and inter-
state commerce, the United States Supreme Court struck down the
119. Id. at 550.
120. Id. The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas found that
the Gun-Free School Zones Act was a valid exercise of congressional power but the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit disagreed, finding the Act granted the federal
government powers beyond the scope of the United States Constitution. See id.; U.S. v.
Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342 (5th Cir. 1993).
121. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567-68.
122. Id. at 559-60. Under previous decisions by the United States Supreme Court, fed-
eral government regulation under the Commerce Clause is limited to activities affecting the
"channels" of interstate commerce, activities affecting the "instrumentalities" of interstate
commerce, and to activities "substantially affecting" interstate commerce. Here, the United
States Supreme Court concluded that if the Gun-Free School Zones Act was to be a valid
exercise of congressional power under the Commerce Clause, it must be designed to regu-
late an activity which "substantially affects" interstate commerce. Specifically, the majority
noted:
The first two categories of authority may be quickly disposed of: [The Gun-Free
School Zones Act] is not a regulation of the use of the channels of interstate com-
merce, nor is it an attempt to prohibit the interstate transportation of a commodity
through the channels of commerce; nor can [the Gun-Free School Zones Act] be justi-
fied as a regulation by which Congress has sought to protect an instrumentality of
interstate commerce or a thing in interstate commerce. Thus if [the Gun-Free School
Zones Act] is to be sustained, it must be under the third category as regulation of an
activity that substantially affects interstate commerce.
Id. at 559.




Under the modern view of Commerce Clause analysis as exempli-
fied in Lopez, the federal government can constitutionally regulate
three categories of activities under the Commerce Clause: (1) the
"channels" of interstate commerce; (2) the "instrumentalities" of in-
terstate commerce; and (3) any activities which have a "substantial
effect" on interstate commerce. 125 While the first two are relatively
uncomplicated, the latter is a bit more difficult to apply because,
under the Lopez decision, a distinction must be made between fed-
eral regulation of commercial activity that substantially affects in-
terstate commerce and federal regulation of non-commercial activ-
ity that substantially affects interstate commerce. 126 Where the
activity being regulated is clearly a commercial one substantially af-
fecting interstate commerce, the United States Supreme Court will
likely allow federal government regulation (even if the activity be-
ing regulated, such as in the "Shreveport Rate Case," is completely
intrastate). 127 However, if the federal government is attempting to
regulate a non-commercial activity that affects interstate commerce,
the government will have to show an obvious connection between
the regulation and interstate commerce in order for the regulation
to be held constitutional. 12s Using this modern analysis, may the
federal government constitutionally regulate permanent amusement
rides under the Commerce Clause?
The strongest support for the proposition that the federal govern-
ment can regulate amusement rides permanently fixed to a site
under the Commerce Clause stems from the decision by the United
States Supreme Court in Daniel v. Paul.129 In Daniel, the petition-
ers filed a class action suit, relying on Title II of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, to enjoin the respondent from denying them access to
an amusement park that the respondent owned and operated in Lit-
tie Rock, Arkansas. 13° Specifically, the petitioners contended that
124. See id. at 567-68. The United States Supreme Court rejected an argument by the
government that there was an obvious and substantial connection between carrying firearms
in school zones and interstate commerce. The government argued that: (1) possession of a
firearm in a school zone results in crime and (2) the resulting crime affects the national
economy because it inhibits the willingness of individuals to travel and produces less edu-
cated citizens. Id. at 563-64.
125. See id. at 559.
126. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 566.
127. See id. at 565-68.
128. See id.
129. 395 U.S. 298 (1969).
130. Id. at 300.
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they were denied access on racial grounds and that because the
amusement park operated by the respondent was a public accom-
modation within the meaning of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, the federal court was required to grant appropriate relief.131
Because Title II prohibits racial discrimination only at places of
public accommodation whose operations affect commerce, one of
the principal issues in the case became whether operations at the
amusement park did, in fact, affect counerce.'
32
In addressing the issue, Justice Brennan, writing for the majority,
offered several reasons why the operations at the amusement park
affected commerce. First, Justice Brennan examined the type of
advertising which was done by the amusement park and concluded
that because the advertising media selected by the amusement park
was intended to seek "broad-based patronage" of individuals from
significant distances, it would be unrealistic to assume that that
amusement park entertained no interstate travelers during the
course of its season.'-1 Second, the majority determined that
because a substantial portion of the food served at the snack bar in
the amusement park moved in interstate commerce, the amusement
park itself could be viewed as a public accommodation under Title
II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.14 Finally, the Court reasoned that
the amusement park was a place of entertainment and that many of
the items used to entertain the patrons (such as the paddle boats
and juke box records) were either manufactured outside of the
state or were purchased by the amusement park from out-of-state
vendors. '5
However, because Daniel represents a pre-Lopez decision, it is
necessary to analyze the constitutionality of federal government
regulation of permanent amusement rides further by seeing how
Daniel relates to Lopez. In doing so, it becomes clear that if the
federal government is to be able to constitutionally grant power to
the CPSC to investigate rides at amusement parks, the activities of
amusement parks (such as the advertising, entertainment provided,
and materials used in constructing the rides) must significantly
affect interstate commerce. Clearly, this is the case. In terms of
advertising, numerous parks around the country seek broad-based
patronage through their advertising. For example, the official web
131. Id.
132. See id. at 302.
133. Id. at 304.
134. Daniel, 395 U.S. at 304-05.
135. Id. at 308.
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sites of many parks provide directions on how to get there from
locations outside of the state of the amusement park or from the
nearest airport to the amusement park.13 6 In addition, many of
these advertisements (that are often for new rides) do, in fact, peak
the interest of out-of-state residents who then travel to the park.
137
Furthermore, when a major new ride opens, publications from
around the country often cover the opening of the ride, thereby
again spurring interest and encouraging travel to the location of the
park with the new ride. 13 Finally, many of these new rides are
made with parts from states outside of the state where the ride is
located and by manufacturers who do not regularly do business in
the state where the ride is located. 139 Therefore, given the broad-
based patronage that many amusement parks seek and the fact that
ride parts come from a variety of suppliers who are often located
significant distances from where the ride is located, the federal
government can likely regulate rides at America's amusement parks
consistent with the Commerce Clause of the Untied States Consti-
tution.
136. See, e.g., Busch Gardens (visited Mar. 11, 2001) <http://www.buschgardens.com>
(detailing how to get to Busch Gardens in Williamsburg, Virginia, from a variety of states
including Georgia, North Carolina, Maryland, and Pennsylvania); Cedar Point (visited Mar.
11, 2001) <http://www.cedarpoint.com> (describing how to get to Cedar Point in Sandusky,
Ohio, from a variety of states in the east including Georgia, Illinois, Maryland, North Caro-
lina, and Pennsylvania); Dorney Park and Wildwater Kingdom (visited Mar. 12, 2001) <http://
www.dorneypark.com> (providing web users with directions on how to get to Dorney Park
in Allentown, Pennsylvania, from northeastern states such as New Jersey and New York);
Kennywood (visited Mar. 11, 2001) <http://www.kennywood.com> (providing directions on
how to get to Kennywood Park just outside of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, from a number of
states including Ohio and Maryland and also from Pittsburgh International Airport);
Silverwood Theme Park (visited Mar. 13, 2001) <http://www.silverwood4fun.com> (discussing
the close proximity of Silverwood Theme Park in Athol, Idaho, to the Spokane International
Airport in Spokane, Washington).
137. See Peg Batchelder, A Beautiful Day at the Lake, ACE NEWS CITH OFICIAL NEWS-
IMrER OF THE AMERICAN COASTER ENTnusiS), July-Aug. 2000, at 17 (stating that advertise-
ments and reports on the "Boulder Dash!" roller coaster prompted nearly 300 individuals
from twenty states to attend a special gathering at Lake Compounce Family Theme Park in
Bristol, Connecticut, where the "Boulder Dash!" roller coaster is located).
138. See, e.g., Alice Lukens, A Roller-Coaster Ride on Safety, THE BALTIORiE SUN, May
22, 2000, at 2A (discussing the opening of the "Millennium Force 2000" at Cedar Point in San-
dusky, Ohio); Cindy Stout, HURRICANE Hits Myrtle Beach, ACE NEWS (THE OrIctAL NEWS-
LETTER OF THE AMERICAN COASTER ENTHusiAsTS), July-Aug. 2000, at 12 (describing what it feels
like to ride the "Hurricane" roller coaster at the Myrtle Beach Pavilion in Myrtle Beach,
South Carolina).
139. See generally THE AMERICAN COASTER ENTHusiAsTS, GuIDE To RIDE 2000 (Digital
Prepress, 2000) (providing a comprehensive summary of the statistics on each roller coaster
in the United States, including the manufacturer of the roller coaster).
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B. Current State Laws Are Inadequate and Inconsistent
As Table B illustrates, states vary widely in their approach to reg-
ulating amusement rides, particularly those that are permanently
attached to a site. For example, in states such as Ohio, Penn-
sylvania, and New Jersey, regulation is routine and rigorous.
40
However, in states like Alabama, Missouri, and Montana, regulation
of rides permanently fixed to a site is non-existent. 4' In addition,
states vary with respect to the burden on ride owners to record
and report serious accidents. Currently, thirteen states have no
laws requiring owners to report injuries, and in the remaining
thirty-seven states that do, the definition of a "reportable injury"
can vary widely.42 For example, suppose that a patron sustains an
injury while riding the "Ferris Wheel" at Dorney Park in Allentown,
Pennsylvania. While Dorney Park (given the rigid requirements
which the Amusement Ride Inspection Act sets forth) may have to
report the incident to the Department of Agriculture, if a rider sus-
tained the same accident at Six Flags in St. Louis, Missouri, the
park may not have to report the accident due to the lack of any
legal duty to do so.'" Due to the inconsistencies in reporting, it is
very difficult for state safety officials to pinpoint which rides and
which parks are having safety problems and to warn patrons
accordingly.' 44
In addition, ,the inconsistency in state inspection procedures of
amusement rides has resulted in great disparities. According to
USA Today, in states where inspections are rigorous, "inspectors
routinely find problems, shut down rides, and report fewer serious
accidents."' 45 However, even in states that require inspections,
some types of parks and carnival rides are exempt.' 46 For example,
under the Florida statute regulating amusement rides, parks are to
be inspected twice a year, but a clause in the statute exempts
140. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 5:3-32-5:3-39 (West 1996); OHiO REv. CODE ANN. §§
1711.50-1711.58, 1711.99 (West 1997); 4 PA STAT. ANN. §§ 401-19 (West 1995).
141. See Best's Review, State Regulation and Inspection of Amusement Rides (visited
Mar. 11, 2001) <http://www.bestreview.compc/1999-09/chrtstateregl.htm>.
142. See Anthony DeBarros and Gene Sloan, Park Safety Rules Lax, USA TODAY, Apr. 7,
2000, at IA (discussing the inadequacies and inconsistencies in current state laws regulating
the amusement industry)..
143. Compare Mo. REV. STAT. § 316.209 (2000), and Mo. REV. STAT. §316.212 (2000), with
4 PA. STAT. ANN. § 407 (West 1995), and 4 PA. STAT. ANN. § 413 (West 1995).





America's most popular theme park, Disney World. 147 These incon-
sistencies and exemptions also contribute to the inability of safety
officials to pinpoint which rides are causing problems.
C. The Amusement Industry Does Not Have the Situation Under
Control
Not surprisingly, the amusement industry, which generated $9.6
billion in 1999, stands starkly opposed to any federal interference
with the regulation of permanent amusement rides. In May of 2000,
the president of the International Association of Amusement Parks
and Attractions (IAAPA) made this view known when he testified
before a congressional subcommittee that the amusement industry
is already "effectively and adequately regulated" by the states.'1s
During this testimony, the president of the IAAPA also questioned
the results of the CPSC study, stating that the numbers generated
by the CPSC in its annual report on amusement accidents do not
actually reflect an increase in injuries, but merely a change in the
method of data collection (a contention that the CPSC strongly
opposes). 149 In addition to pointing to current state legislation and
questioning the federal data, industry experts argue the industry
has a strong incentive to regulate itself since notable accidents
(like the six deaths in 1999) result in decreased patronage which in
turn decreases industry profit.' 5° However, these industry argu-
ments fail on three principal counts. I
First, it is clear that many states "have simply failed to step in
where the federal agency has been excluded."' 51 Several states still
have no laws regulating permanent amusement rides and others
have cleverly structured their laws to exempt the major players in
the industry from any regulation whatsoever. 52 Other states impose
very minimal restrictions on the operation of permanent amuse-
147. See id.
148. See Jared Costanza (Amusement Ride Accident Reports and News), Markey
Pushes For Common Sense Federal Oversight of Park Rides (visited Mar. 11, 2001) <http://
www.members.aol.com/rides9ll/2000.htm#mayl6>.
149. See id.
150. See DeBarros and Sloan, supra note 141. According to the IAAPA president,
amusement parks "already have rigorous safety inspections both in-house and by their insur-
ance companies. If anybody is slipshod and injuring great numbers, they are not going to get
insurance. They are not going to stay in business." See id.
151. See 145 CONG. REC. E2042 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1999) (statement made by Representa-
tive Edward Markey of Massachusetts when introducing "The National Amusement Park Ride
Safety Act").
152. See DeBarros and Sloan, supra note 141.
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ment rides and a remaining few states still leave regulation to pri-
vate inspectors.1 53
Second, the states "are not equipped and not inclined to act as a
national clearinghouse of safety problems associated with particu-
lar rides or with operator or patron errors. "' 1 Since the CPSC is
charged, under the Consumer Product Safety Act, with protecting
the public against dangerous products, it only makes sense to allow
the CPSC to act as a national clearinghouse. Yet federal law cur-
rently -forbids the CPSC from doing so. As a result, there is cur-
rently no uniform system for reporting ride accidents, which makes
it difficult for safety inspectors to pinpoint which rides often pose
a danger to the public.
155
Finally, because the industry argues safety is of primary concern
(given that unsafe parks result in decreased attendance and, hence,
decreased profit), it is senseless for the industry to oppose limited
federal regulation of permanent amusement rides that could lead to
a reduction in accidents. As noted earlier, in states where inspec-
tions are rigorous (such as New Jersey), safety inspectors are bet-
ter able to detect ride-related problems; hence, fewer serious acci-
dents are reported in those states.
15 6
CONCLUSION
Over the past decade and a half, thrill-rides at America's amuse-
ment parks have become the premier attraction for millions of
Americans who flock to parks from coast to coast in anticipation
of experiencing the new thrilling sensations that modern day
scream machines provide. There certainly has been no shortage of
supply of such thrills by the amusement industry, as ride manufac-
turers continue to crank out new rides and revamp old ones to
meet increasing consumer demand.157 In the process, many modem
153. See id.
154. See 145 CONG. REC. E2042, supra note 150.
155. See DeBarros and Sloan, supra note 141.
156. See supra note 144. For example, in New Jersey, which three years ago changed
its laws regarding inspection of permanent amusement rides, serious accidents (defined as
those resulting in a broken bone or worse) have been cut in half, from twenty-four in 1997
to twelve in 1999. See DeBarros and Sloan, supra note 141.
157. An example of revamping an older ride can be found at Kennywood Park, located
just outside of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. The park recently announced that its "Steel Phan-
tom" roller coaster, which opened in 1991, will be partially rebuilt and will reopen in April of
2001 as "The Phantom's Revenge." See Laura Pace, Kennywood Not Letting the Phantom
Steal Away-Smoother, Faster Coaster to Include Parts of Old One, PrrrsBURGH POST
GAZETrE, Aug. 11, 2000, at Cl. Roughly 738 roller coasters are currently in operation from
coast to coast. Approximately sixty-one new roller coasters opened in the year 1999 and
2001
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day scream machines now take consumers on journeys to record-
breaking heights at speeds that were only once dreamed of by con-
sumers and ride manufacturers. 15 In the process, many modem
rides challenge the limits of human endurance, and, unfortunately,
the steady increase in accidents at America's amusement parks sug-
gests what has intuitively been known for decades-the human
body can only be pushed so far.159 Furthermore, despite the signifi-
cant advance in technology that has seemed to spar the thrill-ride
renaissance of the past decade and a half, technology still remains
fallible. When technology fails on a modem day scream machine,
the results can be catastrophic.
While there will always be a demand for such rides and while the
fifty-five more opened between January 1, 2000, and October 11, 2000. See The Roller Coaster
Data Base (visited Mar. 11, 2001) <http://www.rcdb.com> (a comprehensive searchable
database with information and statistics on roller coasters in North America).
158. For example, in 1989, Cedar Point, in Sandusky, Ohio, debuted the "Magnum
XL-200," which at the time was the tallest, fastest, and steepest roller coaster in the world
with a height of 201 feet, a vertical drop of roughly 195 feet, and a speed of seventy miles
per hour. Nearly a decade later, another Cedar Point roller coaster set the record for the tall-
est, fastest, and steepest roller coaster in the world. The "Millennium Force 2000" opened on
May 13, 2000, as the tallest, fastest, and steepest steel roller coaster in the world with a
height of 310 feet and an estimated speed of ninety-two miles per hour. See Richard P. Car-
penter, Roller Coasters-Tallest And Steepest, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 8, 1990, at B10 (discussing
the tallest and fastest roller coasters in the world in 1990); Jefferson Graham, Magnum
Force-It's the Ultimate Coaster So Far, USA TODAY, May 8, 1989, at ID (a ride review of
"Magnum Force XL-200" at Cedar Point in Sandusky, Ohio); Alice Lukens, A Roller-Coaster
Ride On Safety, THE BALTIMORE SUN, May 22, 2000, at 2A (discussing the "Millennium Force
2000" as well as the National Amusement Ride Safety Act that is currently pending in the
United States House of Representatives).
159. There is some indication that the high g-forces associated with roller coasters can
trigger brain trauma in even the healthiest of individuals. See Evan Harlper, Ride at Your
Own Risk, GOOD HOUSKEEPING, July 2000, at 87 (discussing the internal injuries that one rider
sustained while riding the "Steel Force" roller coaster, advertised by Dorney Park in Allen-
town, Pennsylvania, as the "longest, tallest, and fastest roller coaster in the northeast"). As a
result, many politicians have begun to question the high-speed intensity of many modern
thrill-rides. For example, Representative Edward Markey (the sponsor of "The National
Amusement Ride Safety Act") contacted the director of the National Institutes of Health in
March, 2000, by letter seeking a baseline for judging the rapidly rising g-forces on roller
coasters. Markey wrote about modern-day roller coasters in part:
Not only are these giant coasters exempt from federal safety legislation, they also
operate without any consensus, within the industry or the public health community,
about the point at which brain trauma can be triggered in healthy children or adults
simply from the snap of the neck or the pressure on blood circulation generated by
high g-forces. The industry may think it is thrilling to operate without "g-force" stan-
dards, but the pediatric, medical, and public health communities need to be the ulti-
mate judges of what is medically safe for our children.
See Press Release, The Office of Ed Markey (United States Congress), Markey Requests
National Institutes of Health Research Potential for Brain Injuries from Riding Roller
Coasters (March 10, 2000) (on file with author).
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amusement industry has every right to continue to provide thrill-
seekers with new challenges to overcome, one way to curtail the
negative effects of the thrill-ride renaissance of the past decade and
a half is to restore power to the CPSC to regulate rides perma-
nently fixed to an amusement site. Specifically, the United States
Congress should adopt "The National Amusement Ride Safety Act"
as introduced by Representative Edward Markey, which amends
the Consumer Product Safety Act in a manner that does just that.
The United States Congress should do this for three principal rea-
sons. First, CPSC regulation of amusement rides permanently fixed
to a site would not be inconsistent with the Commerce Clause of
the United States Constitution. Second, such regulation would elim-
inate the gross disparities and inadequacies exemplified by current
state laws regulating fixed amusement rides. Finally, federal regula-
tion would benefit consumers by ensuring that fixed amusement
rides are adequately inspected and may also increase the overall
profit of the amusement industry (assuming that such regulation
would reduce the number of ride-related accidents and fatalities).
Brandon D. Coneby
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TABLE A: SELECTED RECENT ACCIDENTS AT AMERICA'S THEME PARKS
DATE LOCATION DESCRIPTION OF THE ACCIDENT
February 22, Las Vegas, NV A three-year old girl suffered fatal head injuries after
1997 falling from the "Sizzler" ride and becoming trapped
beneath another car
April 20, 1997 Tulsa, OK A fourteen-year old boy was killed (and five others
injured) when two cars collided on the "Wildcat" roller
coaster
August 9, Houston, TX A fifty-one year old maintenance worker was struck
1997 by a train while examining a piece of track on the
"Excalibur" roller coaster (the train had been sent out
for a test run but a signal failed to inform the worker
of the train's presence on the track)
April 18, 1998 Gurnee, IL Twenty-three riders on the "Demon" roller coaster
were stranded upside down for hours as a result of a
mechanical failure (four passengers were treated and
eventually released)
August 1, St. Paul, MN A twelve year old boy was killed after falling from a
1998 log flume ride (the ride, similar to others like it, was
not equipped with a seat belt or restraint mechanism)
August 5, Clementon, NJ Three people were injured after the "Jack Rabbit"
1998 roller coaster on which they were riding jumped the
track and crashed into the management office (the
park blamed the accident on the actions of the
operator who was subsequently arrested)
March 21, Arlington, TX A twenty-eight year old female died when the boat
1999 she was riding on capsized, trapping her underneath
(the official cause of death was listed as drowning)
June 11, 1999 Brooklyn, NY A seventeen-year old female was killed on the "Super
Himalaya" roller coaster after the car in which she
was riding flipped over and tossed her ten to fifteen
feet in the air before pinning her on the track under
another car
July 17, 1999 Kansas City, Eight riders were treated after the last two cars of the
MO "Orient Express" roller coaster derailed
August 22, Santa Clara, CA A twelve-year old boy was killed after slipping out of
1999 his harness while riding the "Drop Zone" freefall ride
August 23, Doswell, VA A twenty-year old male was killed in an accident on
1999 the stand-up "Shockwave" roller coaster
June 30, 2000 Muskegon, Ml A thirty-eight year old female sustained critical injuries
as a result of a fall sustained on the "Zach's Zoomer"
roller coaster after she turned around in her seat to
take pictures (signs around the ride indicated picture
taking was not allowed)
July 19, 2000 Gurnee, IL Two teenage girls were injured when the floor on the
"Cajun Cliffhanger" ride was raised at the wrong time,
causing the girls to get their feet caught between the
wall and rising floor
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August 18, Wildwood, NJ A nineteen year old worker lost his leg after getting it
2000 entangled in the track of the "Monster Mash ride, a
dark ride located on the Wildwood boardwalk
September 22, Anaheim, CA A four-year old boy was rushed to the hospital in
2000 critical condition after falling out of his car while riding
Disneyland's "Roger Rabbit" ride
September 24, Crete, NB Ten were injured when a swinger ride partially
2000 collapsed
Source: Amusement Ride Accident Reports and News (visited Oct. 11, 2000)
<http://members.aol.com/rides911/accidents.htm>.
TABLE B: SELECTED PROVISIONS OF STATE STATUTES REGULATING
AMUSEMENT RIDES
STATE REQUIREMENTS INSPEcTION REQUIREMENTS
FOR OPERATION
Alabama None None






Arkansas $1 million Current safety inspection by Arkansas Department of
liability policy Labor; inspections at setup
required
California Annual Mobile rides inspected once a year; aerial tramways
operating permit inspected twice a year
Colorado Permits for the Inspection performed by state, insurance companies,
particular year and private firms
Connecticut Application for Annual inspection by professional engineer, inspection
inspection of mobile carnival rides at each new site
required





Florida Safety Mobile rides inspection at each set up; stationary
inspection parks inspected each season (excludes parks that
required employ 1,000 or more full-time employed workers and
have safety inspectors approved by state)
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TABLE B: SELECTED PROVISIONS OF STATE STATUTES REGULATING
AMUSEMENT RIDES CONTINUED
STATE REQUIREMENTS INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS
FOR OPERATION
Georgia Stationary parks Inspected at opening of year and spot checked






Hawaii Certificate of Rides inspected every six months by certified state
inspection inspectors
required
Idaho Permits required Inspection required for each setup
Illinois Permits, Annual inspections with unannounced follow-up




Indiana Permits and Rides inspected on first setup each year
licenses
required
Iowa Annual license Inspected at setup and then annually or spot checks
required thereafter
Kansas None None
Kentucky Permit required One annual inspection required by state
Louisiana Permit required Inspections twice a year
Maine Permits and Annual inspection of stationary rides; inspection of
inspection for mobile rides at setup and when reassembled
license
Maryland Certificate of Annual inspection of stationary rides, inspection of
insurance mobile rides at setup and when reassembled
required
Massachusetts Annual permit Mobile rides inspected
for mobile rides
Michigan Annual permit Annual inspection
required
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TABLE B: SELECTED PROVISIONS OF STATE STATUTES REGULATING
AMUSEMENT RIDES CONTINUED
STATE REQUIREMENTS INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS
FOR OPERATION










Nebraska Annual permit Inspected annually by the state if not done by
required qualified insurance company or private inspector
Nevada Individual city By city code inspectors
can set
requirements
New Registration and Mobile and stationary rides inspected by independent
Hampshire license required inspector before registration; subsequent annual and
intermittent inspections by state
New Jersey Mobile and Inspections before each season; mobile rides





New Mexico Inspections and Annual inspections by National Association of






New York Permits required Annual inspection of stationary rides; mobile rides





North Carolina Permit required Semi-annual inspection of stationary rides; mobile
rides inspected at each setup
North Dakota Insurance None
required
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TABLE B: SELECTED PROVISIONS OF STATE STATUTES REGULATING
AMUSEMENT RIDES CONTINUED
STATE REQUIREMENTS INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS
FOR OPERATION
Ohio permit and Rides inspected before issuance of license;
certificate of depending on firm's history, rides must be inspected
insurance at each subsequent license
required
Oklahoma Annual Stationary rides inspected annually; mobile rides
registration, inspected each time they are setup
insurance
required
Oregon Annual permit Annual inspection of stationary and mobile rides
Pennsylvania Registration and Rides must be inspected by a certified inspector
certificate of every thirty days or at every setup; inspections
inspection conducted by state inspectors on a frequent and
required random schedule
Rhode Island Certificate to Annual-generally, insurance companies conduct their
operate issued own inspections but in an accident/incident situation,
by local building state building officials will investigate
or electrical
inspector
South Carolina Permit and Annual and unannounced inspection; operator
$500 liability inspections also
insurance
required
South Dakota Permit required None




Texas Insurance Annual inspection (inspectors required to be
requirement professionally qualified by insurer)
Utah None None
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TABLE B: SELECTED PROVISIONS OF STATE STATUTES REGULATING
AMUSEMENT RIDES CONTINUED
STATE REQUIREMENTS INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS
FOR OPERATION
Virginia Permit required Inspections required before each operation, after any
from the local major modification or after each assembly; inspections
building performed only by inspectors that have met Virginia's





Washington Annual Annual safety and mechanical inspection; electrical






West Virginia Mobile ride None
license required








Wisconsin Annual Seasonal inspections for stationary and mobile rides;
registration re-inspection when violations are found
Wyoming None None
Source: Best's Review, State Regulation And Inspection of Amusement Rides (visited
Mar. 10, 2001) <http://www.bestreview.com/pc/1999-09/chrtstateregl .html>.

